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THE NIXON BOARD AND RETAIL
BARGAINING UNITS
Stephen C. Vladeckt
For more than four years, three Nixon appointees comprised
the majority of the National Labor Relations Board. Only a review
of all decisions during that period can precisely summarize that
Board's activity. However, the Board's response to retail store unit
problems indicates a definite pattern. To the extent that this
sample of cases offers a fair guide, the Board clearly expressed the
essentially anti-labor bias that permeated substantial parts of the
Nixon administration.
The Nixon Board members were Chairman Edward Miller,
Ralph Kennedy, and John A. Penello. Chairman Miller's term
began on June 3, 1970, and was completed on December 31, 1974.
Ralph Kennedy's term ran from December 14, 1970, until his
resignation effective July 30, 1975. Currently serving as a Board
member, John A. Penello began his term February 22, 1970. John
Fanning and Howard Jenkins remained Board members through-
out the period of the Nixon majority. Fanning was originally
appointed in 1957 and Jenkins in 1963.
During the period of the Nixon majority, the National Labor
Relations Board demonstrated less concern for statutory intention
and judicial precedent than in any other period in its forty year
history. This conclusion is drawn from Board decisions affecting
bargaining units in retail establishments, the effect of accretion
clauses on such bargaining units, and the related question of
whether proof of majority through card counts, where such
agreements exist, should compel the issuance of a bargaining
order. While intentionally narrow, the topics amply portray the
views of the Board members and their effect on policy during the
Nixon Board years.
t Member of the New York Bar, B.A. 1941, New York University; LL.B. 1947,
Columbia University. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of
Arthur F. Silbergeld.
Mr. Vladeck is a partner in a law firm that specializes in the representation of labor
unions.
THE NIXON BOARD
I
BARGAINING UNITS
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides that col-
lective bargaining representatives are to be designated or selected
by the majority of employees in "a unit appropriate for such
purposes."' Subject to the mandate that it pursue the ultimate
purpose of assuring employees the fullest freedom in exercising
rights secured by the Act,2 the Board possesses almost unlimited
power 3 in determining the composition of a bargaining unit. To
act with necessary discretion and to retain flexibility, the Board has
liberally construed the term "appropriate." In Morand Brothers
Beverage Co., 4 the Board found that
[t]here is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for
bargaining be the only appropriate unit, or the ultimate unit, or
the most appropriate unit; the Act requires only that the unit be
"appropriate." It must be appropriate to ensure the employees, in
each case, "the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by this Act."5
Although it bore no relationship to their announced intention,
the Board until 1962 regularly held that the appropriate unit in
multistore retail operations encompassed all employees of outlets
within the employer's administrative division or geographic area.6
In adopting an easily identified unit, the Board simplified its own
task. Little weight was given to the factors that guided determina-
tions in multiplant industrial enterprises: the geographic separa-
tion of plants, the degree of interchange of employees, the degree
of autonomy of each unit, and the bargaining history.7 American
I National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). The statute also requires the Board to give special
consideration to professional employees and guards.
' See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
4 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
s Id. at 418.
6 See, e.g., Daw Drug Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316 (1960) (pharmacists in 16 store division);
Crown Drug Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1126 (1954) (drugstore employees in 31 store division);
Herpolsheimer Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1952) (department stores, 25 miles apart); Safeway
Stores, 96 N.L.R.B. 998 (1951) (meat department employees in division); Kroger Co., 88
N.L.R.B. 194 (1950) (butchers); Westbrook Enterprises, Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1948)
(dining room and kitchen employees). Although the Board reserved the right to apply
different standards in "unusual circumstances," such exceptions were rarely granted. See
Diana Shop, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 743 (1957); Liggett Drug Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 949 1954).
7 See, e.g., American Linen Supply Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 993 (1960); General Shoe Corp.,
113 N.L.R.B. 905 (1955).
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Stores Co.3 exemplifies the absurd results which occasionally fol-
lowed from the inflexible application of this divisional or geo-
graphic area rule of thumb. In American Stores, the Board held
appropriate a single unit of a retail food chain operation which
stretched more than 100 miles from a warehouse in Rahway, New
Jersey, to Riverhead, Long Island, with no stores in the intervening
distance.
Sav-On Drugs, Inc.9 marked a landmark modification in the
Board's approach. Seeking to represent separate units of profes-
sional and nonprofessional employees in a single retail outlet of a
nine store chain, petitioner argued that where the employees shared
no community of interest, the statutory reference to "a unit" rather
than "the" unit justified a deviation from the administrative divi-
sion or geographic area standard. Petitioner asserted that the
employer's organizational structure should have no more influence
than the extent of the union's organization. I" The employer re-
sisted, urging the Board to employ its usual standard and to find
the appropriate unit to encompass all like employees of the nine
stores in the administrative subdivision of the parent corporation.
The Board acknowledged that its past policy toward multistore
retail outlets frequently impeded the exercise of employee rights to
self-organization under the Act, and found the single store unit
appropriate. The Board announced that thereafter it would "apply
to retail chain operations the same unit policy which we apply to
multiplant enterprises in general."" The four factors to be consid-
ered in determining appropriate bargaining units were: (1) the
geographic separation of the store in question from the others; (2)
real and substantial managerial authority on the part of the store
manager; (3) the degree of employee interchange between the one
store and the others; and (4) the absence of a union competing to
represent the employees in a differently structured unit. 2
For several years after the Say-On decision, the National Labor
Relations Board found that, where the criteria were satisfied, a
single retail unit comprised an appropriate collective bargaining
unit.' 3 In Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 14 the Board stated that even
8 22-RC-583 (1959). This case was brought in NLRB Region 22 and is unreported.
9 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962), injunction denied, 51 L.R.R.M. 2368 (D.N.J. 1962).
10 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1970) provides that "[i]n determining whether a unit is
appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to which
the employees have organized shall not be controlling."
11 138 N.L.R.B. at 1033.
12 Id. at 1033-35.
13 Shop'n Save Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1969) (single unit at one of five stores in state);
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where a division-wide unit was most appropriate, a union seeking
recognition in a single store would be granted that unit determina-
tion if the store alone was appropriate. The majority held that
Say-On did not stand for the proposition that the administrative
division or geographical area was the presumptively appropriate
unit absent grounds showing that a smaller unit should be estab-
lished. The Board stated:
No such presumption exists. Rather, the Board there abandoned
the approach that a multistore unit alone could be appropriate
and adopted the view that the general unit criteria should apply
to retail store units. Under such criteria a single-plant unit is
presumptively appropriate unless it be established that the single
plant has been effectively merged into a more comprehensive
unit so as to have lost its individual identity. 15
The Taft-Hartley Amendment to section 9(c)(5) provides that
"[i]n determining whether a unit is appropriate . . .the extent to
which the employees have organized shall not be controlling."' 6
The traditional union position was that the extent and nature of
the employer's organization should not control the appropriate
unit. Indeed, many of the early retail unit determinations by the
Board frustrated union organization. Where a common employer
is virtually the only community of interest among employees,
administrative and geographic units make organizing difficult if
not impossible. Such a result contradicts the purpose of the NLRA.
Due to the flexibility created by the Say-On decision, the organiza-
tion of retail stores more closely resembled what the Board had
permitted in other industries through its unit decisions.
In Twenty-First Century Restaurant Corp., 17 the Nixon Board first
indicated that it would limit those section 7 rights whose exercise
Raymond's Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 838 (1966) (retail employees of one of seven stores); Win. H.
Block Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 318 (1965) (food service employees at one of five stores); Purity
Food Stores, Inc. (Sav-More Food Stores), 150 N.L.R.B. 1523 (1965), enforcement denied, 354
F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965), decision on remand, 160 N.L.R.B. 651 (1966), set aside, 376 F.2d 497
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967) (employees at one of seven stores); Sun Drug Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 669 (1964), enforced, 389 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1966) (single drug store in
mutistore chain); Mary Carter Paint Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 46 (1964) (all retail employees in 17
stores); Overton Mkts., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963) (separate grocery and meat units
covering all ten stores).
14 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
1i 147 N.L.R.B. at 551 n.1. Accord, Grand Union Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 230 (1969); Kostel
Corp., d/b/a Big Ben Shoe Store, 172 N.L.R.B. 1523 (1968); Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B.
877 (1968).
16 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1970).
17 192 N.L.R.B. 881 (1971). The Board reached a similar result in Waiakamilo Corp.,
dlb/a McDonald's, 192 N.L.R.B. 878 (1971), which presented virtually identical facts.
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the Sav-On decision had facilitated. Confronted with facts substan-
tially the same as those in Frisch's Big Boy, Board chairman Miller
and member Kennedy dismissed a petition for a bargaining unit at
a single McDonald's restaurant in Brooklyn. The employer, who
owned twenty-two separately incorporated restaurants in the New
York-New Jersey area through a single franchise agreement with
McDonald's Corporation, contended that the appropriate unit en-
compassed all of its operations or, alternatively, the seven located
in New York, one of its two administrative divisions. Abandoning
the presumption favoring the single unit and narrowly construing
the criteria enumerated in Say-On, the majority found that the local
manager had little autonomy, that labor relations policy emanated
from the corporate headquarters, and that geographic proximity
was sufficient to require a larger bargaining unit. Without consider-
ing the conditions imposed on the chain by the franchise agree-
ment, Miller and Kennedy stressed that
[i]n our opinion it is significant that all of the franchised
food outlets of the Employer conduct business under standard-
ized policies and procedures subject to close centralized control.
It is clear that the location manager is vested only with minimal
discretion with respect to labor relations matters and the method
of operation and the exercise of his discretion is carefully moni-
tored by the field supervisor who visits each location daily and
the general manager who makes frequent visitations.' 8
The request for the single location unit was therefore denied.' 9
In dissent, member Fanning argued that the local manager
possessed the requisite authority, that the interchanges of em-
ployees among the stores were relatively infrequent and insig-
nificant, and that the single store unit was appropriate under the
test of Sav-On and subsequent cases. Fanning stressed that the
record evidenced a close community of interest among the em-
ployees in the single store. Most importantly, he condemned the
majority's overemphasis of the employer's "internal organization
factor at the expense of factors most closely related to employees'
relationships with each other. 2 0
The Nixon Board hastened its retreat in Gray Drug Stores, Inc.21
Except as an alternative, the union in Gray Drug did not desire a
single store unit. It alleged that there was substantial interchange
18 192 N.L.R.B. at 882.
"2 The Nixon Board's apparent preference for larger units was reflected in
Consolidated Foods Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 87 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1974).
20 192 N.L.R.B. at 884.
21 1R7 N.L.R.B. 924 (1972).
420 [Vol. 61:416
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of employees among eleven stores in Dade County (Greater
Miami). The petitioner argued that the county constituted an
appropriate unit because the employees shared a legitimate com-
munity of interest. The employer demanded a statewide unit of
thirty drugstores extending for almost 300 miles along Florida's
eastern seaboard. Two district managers exercised authority over
stores located in both Dade and Broward (greater Fort Lauderdale)
Counties. Recognizing this administrative division, the majority
held that
a grouping of Dade County stores would not be coextensive with
the supervision exercised over them and would lack operational
autonomy....
... A unit encompassing all employees in Broward and Dade
counties would consist of employees subject to operational super-
vision with no other employees in the chain and constitute a
geographic cluster suggesting a community of interest distinct
from employees at the Employer's remaining stores.21
Accordingly, the election unit consisted of the employees from
both counties. Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented. Each
county constituted a "standard metropolitan statistical area" and
occupied a distinct geographic area. 3 In the dissent's view, the
majority sought to apply the combined factors of both geographic
area and administrative division rather than the pre-Sav-On stan-
dard of either geographic or administrative division.24
Miller, Kennedy, and Penello determined bargaining units
by applying standards they deemed more appropriate than those
mandated by the NLRA or previously developed by the Board.
Wickes Furniture25 demonstrates this tendency. The petitioner
sought a unit of salesmen at the employer's furniture store. The
majority accepted the employer's argument that the only appropri-
ate bargaining unit extended storewide to include sales, display,
data processing, clerical, warehouse, and repair shop personnel.
22 Id. at 926.
23 "Standard definitions of metropolitan statistical areas were first issued by the then
Bureau of the Budget in 1949. Generally conceived, a 'metropolitan area' is an 'integrated
economic and social unit with a large population nucleus.'" Id. at 927, quoting BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1971, at 829, 890 (1971).
24 In Consolidated Foods Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 87 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1974), Miller,
Kennedy, and Penello implied that the administrative division and geographical area
standards may be applied independently in a unit determination. But compare the
application of these tests in the alternative in a decision by Miller, Fanning, and Penello.
Daytex Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 406 (1973).
25 201 N.L.R.B. 606 (1973). In accord are several companion cases: Wickes Furniture,
201 N.L.R.B. 608 (1973); Wickes Furniture, 201 N.L.R.B. 610 (1973); Wickes Furniture, 201
N.L.R.B. 615 (1973).
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Miller, Kennedy, and Penello reasoned that all employees worked
in the same building, punched the same time clock, and used the
same lounge. Again dissenting, Fanning and Jenkins believed that
the statute's standard tests of appropriateness were not satisfied.
Salesmen were independently supervised, performed essentially
different work, received commissions, and had little contact with
some of the other groups of employees. There was no demonstra-
tion of any community of interest other than a common employer.
In Frito-Lay, Inc.,2 6 the three Nixon appointees accepted a
bargaining unit which included route salesmen from Phoenix and
Tucson, Arizona, to Las Vegas, Nevada. Wholly disregarding the
geographic gerrymandering which obviously resulted, Miller, Ken-
nedy, and Penello based their rationale entirely on the fact that
these territories coincided with the company's regional sales divi-
sion. The majority emphasized that
implementation of the Employer's sales effort is effectuated at
the regional level .... The regional sales manager is responsible
for determining how these products are allocated within his
region. He is also responsible for the profits from his region and
for expense planning for the region .... Although each district
has a district shles manager who is concededly a supervisor, the
record reveals that the district sales managers have no authority
in these matters. Indeed, the record shows that, under the
Employer's method of operation, it is not possible to determine
expenses at any level below that of the region, and that profits
are not broken down by district.27
Since virtually all key administrative decisions were made regional-
ly, the majority dismissed the petitioner's request for a unit com-
prised only of salesmen operating from the Phoenix office.
Fanning and Jenkins responded that the petition filed for Phoenix
salesmen identified an appropriate unit. They accused the majority
of isolating the only factor which is entirely within the control of
the employer, i.e., common supervision, and of ignoring all other
criteria-community of interest, lack of interchange, geographic
cohesiveness-which could have justified approval of the smaller
unit. Fanning and Jenkins contended that the majority position
represented a "move from the statutory prohibition of unit control
by extent of employee organization to a new administrative theory
calculated to insure unit control by employer organization. 2 8
These decisions in which the Nixon appointees redefined the
26 202 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1973).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1014.
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alternative "appropriate unit" tests inevitably limit the right of
retail employees to organize. The Sav-On announcement of the
presumptive appropriateness of a single store unit had removed
artificial and unwarranted limitations on section 7 organizational
rights. The Nixon majority not only resurrected the earlier bar-
riers, but also created new ones. This new tack was not a total
abandonment of Sav-On and its progeny since the Nixon Board did
heed its criteria when to do otherwise could not be justified.29
Whenever an opportunity was presented, however, the Board
found the larger unit-usually conforming to the employer's ad-
ministrative organization-to be appropriate.
II
BARGAINING UNITS AND ACCRETION
When an employer expands an existing enterprise through the
acquisition or creation of an additional plant, store, or department,
the union representing an existing bargaining unit may demand
that he treat new employees as an accretion. Such a demand is
based upon recognition of an "after-acquired" plant or store clause
in its contract. The employer may resist recognition and counter-
demand proof of a card majority. Alternatively, he may seek a
representation election on the ground that the new facility consti-
tutes a "separate" unit. The retail industry has obviously experi-
enced more accretion problems than any other enterprise. Food
chains have customarily grown by adding stores in new locations.
The Sav-On decision affected the policy of the NLRB with regard
to adding new stores to existing bargaining units. The Board has
refused to find accretion when, as in Sav-On, the unit for which
inclusion is sought would also be appropriate as a separate unit,
taking the position that section 7 rights of new employees would be
better protected by denying accretion and compelling a demonstra-
tion of majority status in the smaller unit.3 0
The NLRB has not hesitated to find that employer and union
commit an unfair labor practice when, pursuant to a contract, they
force accretion to the established unit. This approach seeks to
preserve the employees' right to select or reject representation by a
29 See, e.g., Daytex, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 406 (1973).
30 For a full discussion of these cases, see Boire v. Teamsters Union, 479 F.2d 778 (5th
Cir. 1973). See also Super Mkts. General Corp., d/b/a Shop-Rite, 170 N.L.R.B. 446 (1968),
enforced sub nom. Retail Clerks Local 919 v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sunset
House, 167 N.L.R.B. 870 (1967), enforced, 415 F.2d 545-(9th Cir. 1969). Compare Safeway
Stores, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 875 (1969), with Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969).
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labor organization in the "new" facility. It is at least equally protec-
tive of those rights to hold, in the absence of a contest between
unions for representative status, 3' that independent indicia of the
employees' desire to be represented coupled with a contractual
agreement to accrete to an appropriate unit warrants enforcement
of the agreement. Four cases during the Nixon years indicate an
initial move toward the latter position and a subsequent, decisive
retreat from it.
In Melbet Jewelry Co.,32 the employer opened a third store in a
single trading area. Employees at the two older locations were
represented as a single unit by a local of the Retail Clerk's Interna-
tional Association. Arguing that the new store belonged to that
same unit, the local demanded recognition as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent. Since the collective bargaining agreement provided for
the accretion of new stores to the unit, Melbet acceded to the
union's demand. The Board majority, McCulloch and Zagoria,
found that this accretion constituted unfair labor practices by both
the employer and the union. The new store by itself was deemed
an appropriate unit even though the multistore unit might also be
appropriate. The Board held that employees in the new store
should not be represented without their initial consent.
The Board, here, must examine fundamentals and put the
Section 7 rights guaranteed the employees and the appropriate
unit concept of Section 9(b) into proper perspective. Excessive
preoccupation with "appropriate unit" in the circumstances of
this case leads to the abrogation of those rights .... If the Board
were to permit the extension of the contracts covering other
stores ... (thereby very effectively disenfranchising them) . . . it
would, in our opinion, do serious violence to the mandate that
employees' rights are to be protected and that appropriate unit
findings under Section 9(b) must be designed to preserve those
rights.
... We will not ... under the guise of accretion, compel a
group of employees, who may constitute a separate appropriate
unit, to be included in an overall unit without allowing those
employees the opportunity of expressing their preference in a
secret election or by some other evidence that they wish to
authorize the Union to represent them.3"
The majority distinguished an earlier decision, NLRB v. Apple-
31 See Spartan Indus., Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 309 (1968), enforced, 406 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1969).
32 180 N.L.R.B. 107 (1969). See also Super Valu Stores, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 899 (1969);
Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 401 (1969).
33 180 N.L.R.B. at 109-10.
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ton Electric Co., 34 in which the Seventh Circuit rejected a Board
determination of unlawful employer assistance. Pursuant to an
accretion clause, the employer recognized the existing union as
part of the bargaining unit in a newly-acquired plant. The court
found that where the unit is appropriate and the employer acts in
good faith, a contractual agreement validly extends recognition to
the Union as agent for employees of after-acquired plants and
protects the new employees by guaranteeing representation at a
critical period of their employment history. The Melbet majority
stated that the facts in Appleton differed in that a new subsidiary
had been integrated into an operation of the existing company. In
dissent, member Brown saw Appleton as a viable precedent. He
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that such cases do not present
questions of representation, and that when no other labor organi-
zation is present, an employer may lawfully abide by a contract
provision to recognize accretion of an appropriate unit and thereby
favor an incumbent union.
Only two years after Melbet, the NLRB appeared to limit the
scope of that decision. In Retail Clerks Local 870 (White Front),3 5 the
Board gave effect to an accretion clause similar to that in Melbet.
However, the union in White Front had obtained authorization
cards from a majority of employees in the new store. The employer
refused to honor the union's demand for recognition and, when
the union picketed, filed unfair labor practice charges against it.
Dismissing the complaint, Fanning and Jenkins noted that the
parties had agreed that any future store located in the union's
jurisdiction would be deemed an accretion to the existing unit.
They then distinguished the Melbet holding:
Although we have in past cases refused to give controlling weight
to such a clause, our only reason for not giving controlling effect
to the contractual commitment of the parties has been our
concern over protecting the rights of future employees to have a
say in the selection of their bargaining representative. No such
problem exists here, however, because the employees at White
Front, Newark, have already clearly indicated that they wish to
be represented by the Respondent. 36
Since employee rights had not been jeopardized, full effect was
34 296 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1961). Compare Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1970), enforcing 177 N.L.R.B. 25 (1969), with Boire v. Teamsters Union, 479 F.2d
778 (5th Cir. 1973), and Industrial Workers Local 602 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1967).
35 192 N.L.R.B. 240 (1971).Accord, Smith's Management Corp., d/b/a Fraziers Mkt., 197
N.L.R.B. 1156 (1972).
36 192 N.L.R.B. at 242.
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given to the agreement. Chairman Miller, the third member of the
panel, concurred in the result, but refused to pass on the accretion
issue. In two later cases, however, he rejected both the result and
rationale that Fanning and Jenkins had advanced.
With the exception of one component,37 White Front completed
the setting for the factually similar case of Kroger Co., Houston
Division. 3 Miller, Kennedy, and Penello ruled there that even when
an employer had signed an "after-acquired" store contract clause,
he need not accept a card count as evidence of the union's majority
status in a store which was transferred from one administrative
division to another. Thus, the Board narrowly interpreted Snow &
Sons, 39 a decision predating NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 40 to require
that before the Board enforces an after-acquired store contract
clause, the employer must specifically agree to abide by the results
of the card check. The majority did not even mention White Front.
Relying on the precedent of White Front, dissenters Fanning
and Jenkins argued that once the rights of new employees were
protected, as by a card check, full effect should be given to the
accretion clause. They noted that the majority failed to find such a
contract clause illegal, but nevertheless refused to grant its en-
forcement. The minority contended that the contract expressed the
clear intent of the parties not to determine union status through a
Board election and that such a clause clearly contemplated that a
card check would sufficiently demonstrate a majority.
In Smith's Management Corp.,41 a companion case to Kroger, the
same majority adopted the opinion of the administrative law judge.
Distinguishing White Front, he had argued that its controlling facts
were the withdrawal of the employer's offer to test majority status
by card check and the withdrawal of the employer's election
petition. Since Smith had rejected a card offer at the outset and
had not withdrawn its petition, it was not bound by the accretion
clause coupled with the showing of a card majority. The opinion
also stated that Smith's contract contained no specific procedure
for evaluating the union's claim that it represented a majority
within the accreted unit. The refusal to bargain complaint was
dismissed. By adopting this opinion, the majority ignored the
unambiguous holding in White Front approving the card check as
an appropriate means to protect the rights of new employees.
'7 See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra.
38 208 N.L.R.B. 928 (1974).
"9 Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961). See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
40 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See notes 52-78 and accompanying text infra.
41 208 N.L.R.B. 939 (1974).
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The Nixon Board's position in Kroger and Smith was reversed
on appeal in Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB .42 The circuit court
found that the Board had altered its own holdings in White Front
and in a subsequent case involving Smith's Store,43 by requiring a
union to provide evidence of an accretion clause and a sufficient
showing of majority status in addition to a specific agreement by
the employer to waive resort to Board election procedures. The
court recited that this latter requirement carried little weight.
[I]f the "additional store clauses" involved in these cases do not
constitute a "waiver" of the employer's right to a Board-
conducted election, what do they mean? ...
The answer to the question is that the "additional store
clause" can have no purpose other than to waive the employer's
right to a Board ordered election.44
If the employer could enter into such an agreement and, when
presented with a card majority, petition for a Board election, the
agreement would be a nullity.
In Judge Bazelon's view, the Board had intimated in its
opinion and at oral argument that "authorization cards . . . are
insufficiently reliable and inherently coercive of the § 7 rights of
employees . . . ." and that an agreement to recognize majority
status in advance is impermissible. Noting that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co.46
had not addressed this issue,47 the court challenged the Board to
reverse White Front and to hold that rational labor policy renders
"additional store clauses" illegal. By the time the Board issued a
supplemental decision and order, Chairman Miller had stepped
down and the Nixon Board no longer commanded a majority.
Joined by the newly-appointed Chairman Murphy, members
Fanning and Jenkins declined Judge Bazelon's challenge in Kroger
Co., Houston Division.48 Agreeing that national labor policy favors
enforcement of additional store clauses, the Board affirmed its
holdings in White Front and Smith. It thus assured early recognition
of a bargaining agent designated by a majority of employees in
such units. Members Kennedy and Penello dissented from this
42 510 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
43 197 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1972).
44 510 F.2d at 805.
45 Id. at 806.
46 419 U.S. 301 (1974). See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
47 510 F.2d at 807.
48 219 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 89 L.R.R.M.'1641 (1975), supplementing 208 N.L.R.B. 928
(1974). See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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reversal of the Board's previous position in Kroger. Kennedy
insisted that the clause could be meaningless, or in the alternative,
"reasonably" construed to "mean that as the Union acquires the
right to represent employees in additional stores in the division
such stores will be added to the multistore unit and will be covered
by the existing divisionwide bargaining contract."49 Citing Linden
Lumber and Wilder Manufacturing Co.,50 member Penello argued
that absent an unfair labor practice, the bargaining order was
improper. He also argued that the additional stores were not "true
accretions" (whatever that is) and that after-acquired store clauses
do not waive the employer's right to a representation election. 51
III
CARD CHECKS AND BARGAINING ORDERS
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 52 the Supreme Court ruled that
authorization cards can adequately reflect employee sentiment.
When such cards obtained from a majority of employees reliably
establish the union's majority status, the Act53 creates a duty to
bargain without an election. If an employer refuses to accept the
card majority and at the same time commits independent unfair
labor practices that tend to dissipate the majority and undermine
the prospect of a fair election, a bargaining order is an appropriate
remedy. Such unfair labor practices need not be "'outrageous' and
'pervasive,' 54 but must have more than a "minimal impact on the
election machinery. '5 5 The Gissel Court took notice of the Board's
position that an employer innocent of misconduct may not refuse
to bargain if he knows that a majority of his employees support the
union. However, it declined to decide whether a bargaining order
is ever appropriate where there is no interference with the election
process.56
The Board initially adopted a liberal approach in accepting
union authorization cards. In Wilder,57 the Board (Miller, Brown,
Fanning, and McCulloch) squarely interpreted Gissel so as not to
49 Id. at 1643.
50 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
51 89 L.R.R.M. at 1645.
52 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
54 395 U.S. at 613.
5 Id. at 615.
56 Id. at 601 n.18.
i 185 N.L.R.B. 175 (1970), rev'd, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
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require proof of an independent unfair labor practice to justify
issuing a bargaining order when the union had shown a majority.
Presented with cards sufficient to indicate majority status, the
employer in Wilder refused to recognize the union. Eleven of
eighteen employees in the proposed unit responded with strike
activities, including picketing. From this the Board inferred that
the employer knew of the union's status. The employer's failure
thereafter to resolve any doubt by filing a petition or to indicate a
willingness to resolve the representation issue in any other manner,
was deemed sufficient to compel a bargaining order based solely on
a section 8(a)(5) 58 violation. Chairman Miller was the only Nixon
appointee among the Wilder majority. The Board did not hold that
authorization cards provide a freely interchangeable substitute for
an election, but recognized that a card check supplemented by
other convincing evidence of majority support established a duty to
bargain.
Within a few months of the Wilder decision, Chairman Miller
set out an independent position that resolved inconsistencies in the
stance he had appeared to accept in that opinion. As the majority
of the three member panel in United Packing Co.,5 9 Fanning and
Brown held that the Board could order bargaining if an employer
committed numerous secton 8(a)(1) violations and/or refused to
bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5). Chairman Miller, concurring
in the United Packing order, rejected this theory. He insisted that
the Board should carefully distinguish bargaining orders issued to
remedy sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations from those required
by a bargaining refusal and based solely on section 8(a)(5) without
regard to collateral conduct. Arguing that in such cases Gissel
required the Board to examine sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), Miller
found references to section 8(a)(5) to be mere surplusage. Fanning
and Brown understood Miller's position to imply that only serious
violations of section 8(a)(5) warranted the bargaining order
remedy.
Less than one year after announcing it, the NLRB sub silentio
overruled Wilder in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. 60
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
59 187 N.L.R.B. 878 (1971). See also Mid Missouri Motors, 194 N.L.R.B. 505 (1971).
60 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), rev'd sub nam. Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301 (1974). After the Board's ruling, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
remanded Wilder, then on appeal, for reconsideration in light of the Board's Linden Lumber
holding. See 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972), rev'g Wilder Mfg. Co., 185
N.L.R.B. 175 (1970).
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Although the employer in Linden Lumber knew, independently of
the authorization cards, that a majority of the employees supported
the union, the employer refused to participate in or abide by a
representation proceeding. Miller and Kennedy, unexpectedly
joined by Jenkins, construed Gissel to require denial of a bargaining
order. They held that that remedy issued only when an employer's
unfair labor practice was so serious that a fair election was virtually
impossible. The majority followed the holding of Snow & Sons,61
with one exception: when the employer specifically agrees to honor
a card check and subsequently fails to do so, then a remedial
bargaining order would be issued without the commission of inde-
pendent unfair labor practices.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held in Linden Lumber that
absent specific agreement to the contrary, a bargaining order could
not be sustained solely on the basis of a section 8(a)(5) violation of
the duty to bargain. In sustaining the Board's holding that the
union must petition for an election upon the employer's refusal of
recognition, the Court eliminated the key alternative to election. It
departed from its position in Gissel that authorization cards are
inherently reliable, that its general power to issue bargaining
orders required expansion, and that an employer's knowledge of
the union's majority without independent unfair practices could
warrant an order under section 8(a)(5). Guided by its Nixon
appointees and with the prospect of support from a more
conservative Supreme Court, the NLRB in Linden Lumber defiantly
repudiated the approval that the Supreme Court had extended to
the use of bargaining orders in Gissel.
Three lines of Nixon Board decisions illustrate a shift from the
NLRB's earlier position. In each area, the Board severely limited
the use of bargaining orders and consequently compelled unions to
test their support under conditions clearly tainted by employer
misconduct. The Nixon Board applied inordinately strict standards
in the first area-testing the degree of employer misconduct
required to impair the election machinery and to sustain a
bargaining order.
In Claremont Polychemical Corp.62 the employer threatened
through its corporate president to close any unionized plant,
offered benefits for withdrawal of support for the union, and
promised to promote an employee to foreman if the union failed in
61 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
62 196 N.L.R.B. 613 (1972). But see Milgo Industrial Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 1196 (1973);
Justus Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 426 (1972).
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its efforts. Miller and Kennedy found this conduct insufficiently
violative of the act to require a bargaining order based on a card
majority. Fanning dissented, pointing to the statement in Gissel that
employees "are particularly sensitive to rumors of plant closings
[and] take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest
forecasts. 63 Even more severe was the failure of Kennedy and
Jenkins to find substantial interference in Green Briar Nursing
Home. The employer physically assaulted two union organizers in
the presence of employees who had attempted to present him with
cards proving majority status. In the ensuing strike, a picket line
was established. Seeking to scatter the pickets, the employer drove
his automobile toward them at a high rate of speed and actually
brushed one employee. Such conduct, the majority found, "was not
of a type which would have such severe or lingering impact as to
preclude the accurate ascertaining of employee desires through
our usual election procedures. ' 65 Fanning, the lone dissenter in
this series of cases, remarked: "I do not interpret Gissel as
requiring that the employer's unfair labor practices must be the
direct cause of death or bloodshed in order to preclude the holding
of a fair election and thereby merit a bargaining order."66
In Gissel and in Wilder, the Court and the Board had
reaffirmed the traditional position that a union could, as an
alternative to petitioning for an election, present "convincing
evidence of majority support" that "could not in good faith be
ignored. ' 67 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gissel noted that "[t]he
Board [ii. its brief] pointed out, however, (1) that an employer
could not refuse to bargain if he knew, through a personal poll for
instance, that a majority of his employees supported the union
....,68 The Board restated this position in Sullivan Electric Co., 69
where the employer had undertaken a poll of the employees in the
unit proposed. In this rare instance, the Nixon Board based a
bargaining order solely on an 8(a)(5) violation. The Board held
that when an employer solicited this independent proof after
receiving a demand for recognition based on a card majority, he
was bound to the majority status that his poll revealed.
The NLRB soon retreated from the position it took in Sullivan.
63 395 U.S. at 619-20.
14 201 N.L.R.B. 503 (1973).
65 Id. at 504.
66 Id. at 505.
6 NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940).
6' 395 U.S. at 594 (emphasis in original).
69 199 N.L.R.B. 809 (1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1973).
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In Tennessee Shell Co.,70 the Nixon appointees agreed that the
employer's conduct violated section 8(a)(1) in that it involved
interrogation coupled with threats of reprisal for participation in
and support of union organizing activity. Finding Sullivan
inapplicable, the Board reasoned that the employer's direct
knowledge of the extent of union support in the twenty-one person
unit derived from interrogation of only eight employees;
knowledge that three other employees supported the union was
gained indirectly, without interrogation. The Board refused to
issue a bargaining order because the majority support of the union
was "slender," the employer's sources of knowledge were mixed,
and the independent violations were insufficiently destructive of
the prospect of a fair election. Acutely aware of the implications of
the majority's approach and of its disregard of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gissel, Fanning and Jenkins insisted that Sullivan
was controlling:
The consequence of the majority's decision is to permit a
violating employer to force a union to an election which will be
conducted in the shadow of the employer's own misconduct,
after that employer knows because of his own investigation,
including the unlawful conduct, that the union represents a
majority. 71
In another context, the Nixon Board foreshadowed the Linden
Lumber decision of the Supreme Court. In Steel-Fab, Inc.,72 the
NLRB adopted the position expressed by Chairman Miller in
United Packing and Mid Missouri Motors,73 that consideration of a
section 8(a)(5) violation is neither relevant nor desirable in
determining whether to issue a bargaining order, and that only
independent unfair labor practices are essential to support it. In
Steel-Fab, all members agreed that the employer had flagrantly
violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), both before and after an
election. The employer had dissipated the union's established
majority and destroyed the "laboratory conditions" essential to a
fair election.7 4 Miller, Kennedy, and Penello, however, refused to
find a violation of section 8(a)(5) and held that only sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) practices may merit a bargaining order. The majority
expressly denied that the Board, in its argument before the
Supreme Court in Gissel, had claimed an implied power to enter a
70 212 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 86 L.R.R.M. 1704 (1974).
71 Id. at 1709.
72 212 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 86 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1974).
73 194 N.L.R.B. 505, 511 (1971). See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
74 86 L.R.R.M. at 1478.
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bargaining order based solely on a refusal to bargain, absent other
employer unfair labor practices. Although conceding that the Gissel
Court had affirmed the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(5)
violation, the Nixon appointees held that the Court had not
required "such a violation as a predicate for entering a remedial
bargaining order. '7 5 The Steel-Fab majority contended that a duty
to bargain arose only after a valid recognition of the union. Such
refusal before that event would impose a "retroactive bargaining
order.7 6 The NLRB therefore announced that it would not
consider that section of the Act in those future cases where an
order is sought on the basis of a card majority and independent
unfair labor practices.7 7 In separate but parallel opinions, Fanning
and Jenkins concurred in the result, but strongly rejected the
majority's rationale eliminating the section 8(a)(5) consideration.
Fanning read Gissel to permit a bargaining order to remedy a
section 8(a)(5) violation where a card majority exists and an election
would be a less desirable avenue to recognition. He noted that the
Supreme Court had more recently affirmed that a duty to bargain
could arise without an election and that a section 8(a)(5) violation
may result from the refusal to extend recognition based on a card
majority.7 8 Fanning chastized the majority for disregarding Gissel
and for failing to recognize that the purposes of the Act are
effectuated through consideration of alleged section 8(a)(5)
violations.
CONCLUSION
Although it is unrealistic to rely on a single case, one may hope
that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
75 Id. at 1477.
76 Id. at 1476.
7 See Westons Shoppers City, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 89 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1975);
Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 88 L.R.R.M. 1633 (1975); Kelly
Transfer, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 88 L.R.R.M. 1255 (1974); King Arthur Toyota, Inc.,
212 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 87 L.R.R.M. 1661 (1974); Diamond Motors, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No.
119, 87 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1974). In Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 89 L.R.R.M.
1565 (1975), the new Chairman Murphy, together with members Jenkins and Penello and a
concurring opinion by member Fanning, modified this position. Noting that one of the
holdings in Steel-Fab was to make bargaining orders effective only from the date of the
Board's decision, leaving unremedied unilateral changes in working conditions after
majority status had been established, the Board held that "an employer's obligation under a
bargaining order remedy should commence as of the time the employer has embarked on a
clear course of unlawful conduct or has engaged in sufficient unfair labor practices to
undermine the union's majority status." Id. at 1569.
78 NLRB v. Savair Mfg., 414 U.S. 270, 280 (1973).
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Columbia in Retail Clerks Local 455 v. NLRB7 9 is prophetic. Perhaps
the inequities and inconsistencies created by the Nixon Board's
attitude are beginning to end.
In Kroger Co., Houston Division, 80 the majority of the Board
paid lip service to MelbetJewelry, but reaffirmed its earlier decisions
in White Front and Smith Management. "[A]dditional store clauses"
were deemed valid so long as the affected employees were not
denied their right to express their view.81 Moreover, the majority
held that when the union has a valid card majority, "no barrier
[exists] to giving full effect to the contractual commitments of the
parties. '82 There is a solid, old-fashioned ring to the majority
statement of Board policy that accretion clauses waive the
employer's right to demand an election where there is adequate
evidence of majority representation: "To permit the Employer to
claim the very right which it has foregone, perhaps in return for
concessions in other areas, would violate the basic national labor
policy requiring the Board to respect the integrity of collective-
bargaining agreements. '83
That is not to say that one can expect the Board to abandon
either its opposition to pure accretion clauses or its concern for the
preservation of employees' rights in representation proceedings.
Penn Traffic Co. 84 adds little since there was no after-acquired
facility or accretion provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The majority there found five grocery stores, recently ac-
quired by a grocery corporation which had thirty additional stores
in a neighboring state, not to be accreted to the existing unit.
It remains to be seen how long the new Board will adhere to
recent decisions. Will it return to a more rational view of
bargaining units in retail stores? The Court of Appeals' decision in
Retail Clerks Local 455 and the change in the Board membership
have already substantially altered policies. Hopefully in the future
the Board will more closely adhere to its statutory mandates.
79 510 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'g, 208 N.L.R.B. 928 (1974) (indicating the trend as
in the supplemental decision and order of the NLRB in Kroger Co., Houston Div., 219
N.L.R.B. No. 43, 89 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1975)). See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
'0 219 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 89 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1975). The Court of Appeals in Retail Clerks
Local 455 remanded the case to the Board which then issued a supplemental decision sub
nom. in Kroger Co. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
81 89 L.R.R.M. at 1641-42.
82 Id. at 1642.
83 Id.
8' 219 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 89 L.R.R.M. 1676 (1975).
